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Abstract 
This article explores the implications of John Rawls’s political liberalism for linguistic 
diversity and language policy, by focusing on the following question: what kind(s) of equality 
between speakers of different languages and with different linguistic identities should the 
state guarantee under political liberalism? The paper makes three claims. First, language 
policy under political liberalism should guarantee the equal basic rights and liberties of all 
citizens, regardless of language(s) spoken. This may require positive forms of state 
intervention, such as the provision of interpreters and translators in courts of law or hospitals. 
Second, while permissible under political liberalism, symbolic recognition by the state of all 
languages is not required, because the notion of self-respect does not involve the ability to 
identify with the institutions of one’s own political community. Finally, while neither the 
protection of citizens’ basic rights and liberties, nor the guarantee of their self-respect, 
demands multilingual policies, the latter may be required under political liberalism by the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity. This last step involves recourse to democratic 
deliberation in order to ascertain people’s linguistic identities, the costs they associate with 
the enjoyment of available opportunities, and their resulting demands with regard to language 
policy. 
Keywords: language policy, linguistic diversity, John Rawls, political liberalism, equality, 
democratic deliberation. 
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Introduction 
Despite the vast body of scholarship on John Rawls’s (2005a) political liberalism, little 
attention has been paid to the role of language and linguistic diversity within this statement 
on justice and legitimacy.1 Even more surprising is how Rawls himself, in Political 
Liberalism (2005a) but also throughout his scholarship, mostly overlooks how linguistic 
diversity may affect the basic structure of liberal democratic polities. This may be due to 
Rawls’s American background. For Joseph Carens, “Rawls could not have been a Canadian. 
Whatever one’s views about Quebec and French language issues, no Canadian would think it 
appropriate to ignore the problem of language in a comprehensive discussion of justice, just 
as no American writing about justice would leave out the issues of race and religion” (Carens 
2000, 5). Overall, in spite of his growing focus on the fact of reasonable pluralism in 
democratic societies, which strongly influenced the political shift in his later work, Rawls 
never considered how reasonable pluralism also concerns language and linguistic identity. 
 
Rawls’s political liberalism is grounded in “Westphalianism” – the assumption that “the basic 
unit of justice is the monocultural nation-state, which is unified in terms of language, history 
and nationality” (De Schutter 2008, 109). Rawls’s account seems to presuppose that while 
citizens of liberal polities may have significant disagreements over their comprehensive 
(ethical, philosophical, religious) conceptions of the good, they are likely to share the same 
language and linguistic identity. In the Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999b, 24), for example, he 
affirms that the formulation of political principles can more easily be carried out under the 
assumption that liberal societies are “united by common sympathies [...] dependent upon a 
common language, history, and political culture, with a shared historical consciousness.” He 
then adds that “if we begin in this simplified way, we can work out political principles that 
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will, in due course, enable us to deal with more difficult cases where all the citizens are not 
united by a common language and shared historical memories” (Rawls 1999b, 24-5).2 
 
My starting point in this article is the idea, often highlighted in the normative scholarship on 
linguistic justice, that language, unlike religion, cannot be disestablished (see Van Parijs 
2011). Essentially, a state cannot function without a language; its institutions, public services, 
hospitals and schools simply cannot operate without recourse to at least one language. 
Furthermore, while language always has an instrumental or communicative function, it also 
has, for many people, a non-instrumental role, either as a crucial aspect of their identity or as 
an attribute that deserves recognition because it contributes to one’s self-respect (Patten 
2001). By adopting only one official language (or a limited number of official languages), a 
state may therefore impose illegitimate coercive measures on people with certain linguistic 
identities and as a result fail to guarantee their self-respect. 
 
A parallel with religion can be useful. According to Cécile Laborde, plural religious 
establishment is legitimate under political liberalism “if equality between believers of 
different religions is interpreted as mandating even-handed support of all by the state” 
(Laborde 2013, 72). Similarly, it has been argued that equality between persons with different 
linguistic identities warrants even-handed state recognition and support of all languages or as 
many as the state can reasonably recognize and support (De Schutter 2008). This seems to be 
not only permissible but even mandatory under political liberalism; first because 
disestablishment is not an option in the realm of language, and second because language 
almost always carries a dual instrumental and non-instrumental value. Yet the issue is more 
complex than these brief remarks suggest. The question that immediately arises is the 
following: given that linguistic disestablishment is not an option, what kind(s) of equality 
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between speakers of different languages and with different linguistic identities should the 
state guarantee under political liberalism? In exploring this question, the paper proceeds in 
three main parts.  
 
First, I argue that language policy under political liberalism should guarantee the equal basic 
rights and liberties of all citizens, regardless of language(s) spoken and linguistic identity. 
This may require positive forms of state intervention, such as the provision of interpreters and 
translators in courts of law or hospitals. Second, I claim that the value of self-respect, which 
is central to Rawls’s theory, does not directly justify the adoption by the state of 
multilingualism policies, such as the symbolic recognition of all languages by the state or the 
adoption of a regime of linguistic territoriality. Finally, I argue that while neither the 
protection of citizens’ basic rights and liberties nor the guarantee of their self-respect 
demands multilingual policies, the latter may be required under political liberalism by the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity. This last step involves recourse to democratic 
deliberation in order to ascertain people’s linguistic identities, the costs they associate with 
the enjoyment of available opportunities, and their resulting demands with regard to language 
policy. 
 
Linguistic Diversity and the Equal Basic Rights and Liberties of Citizens 
The first and most basic way in which the state under political liberalism should treat 
speakers of all languages equally, regardless of their language and their linguistic identity, 
concerns the protection of their basic rights and liberties. This is clearly expressed by Rawls 
in the first principle of justice. He states: “[e]ach person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, 
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are to be guaranteed their fair value” (2005a, 5). The basic rights and liberties of citizens 
include “freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of 
association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and 
finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law” (2005a, 291).  
 
In relation to language, this implies that all citizens ought to enjoy “toleration and 
accommodation rights” (Patten 2009, 107) regardless of the language(s) they speak and their 
linguistic identity. For example, individuals should have the negative right to express their 
views in their own language (e.g. in books, newspapers or in public) (Patten and Kymlicka 
2003, 34). The state can infringe this right through censorship but also physical harm, as 
when during the Inquisition in Spain “gypsies who were found guilty of speaking their own 
language had their tongues cut out” (Patten and Kymlicka 2003, 23).  
 
In some instances, the effective enjoyment and exercise of certain basic rights and liberties 
may require positive forms of state intervention. One’s right to a fair trial, for example, can 
only be guaranteed if one has the chance to fully understand and communicate what is being 
said in a court of law. Similarly, one’s bodily integrity can only be secured if one can 
communicate his or her symptoms and understand medical advice in hospitals or clinics (e.g. 
Patten 2001, 696). One way of ensuring that such rights are effectively enjoyed is by 
implementing a regime of official bilingualism or multilingualism in public services. In this 
way, “members of the public have a right, sometimes subject to a “where numbers warrant” 
qualification, to receive public services and communications in those languages” (Patten and 
Kymlicka 2003, 19). Official bilingualism or multilingualism can thus be reasonably justified 
by appealing to the need to guarantee citizens’ basic rights and liberties.  
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Yet such measures are not required for that purpose. The state can offer services in only one 
official language and still guarantee the basic rights and liberties of all citizens by providing 
interpreters and translators in courts of law or hospitals. These measures would not differ 
from state funding of chaplaincies in state prisons or army barracks, which are aimed at 
guaranteeing prisoners’ and army personnel’s freedom of conscience and religious exercise 
(Bonotti 2012; Laborde 2013), rather than reflecting the state’s endorsement of one or more 
religious doctrines. Interpretation and translation services can therefore be sufficient to 
guarantee individual basic rights and liberties, especially if the state also promotes the 
learning (and intensive teaching) of the official public language among all its citizens (Patten 
2001). The requirement would be for every citizen to have an opportunity to learn the official 
language, for example as a second language (see Weinstock 2003, 268). In summary, with 
regard to basic rights and liberties, official state multilingualism is permissible but not 
required under political liberalism. 
 
The Symbolic Function of Language 
The conclusion, reached in the previous section, that official monolingualism accompanied 
by accommodation measures may be sufficient to guarantee every citizen’s basic rights and 
liberties, seems to overlook an important dimension of Rawls’s theory. This is the idea of 
“self-respect,” which for Rawls is “perhaps the most important primary good” (Rawls 1999a, 
386). It amounts to “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out” (Rawls 1999a, 386). Moreover, 
it involves “a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s 
intentions” (Rawls 1971, 386). Crucially, self-respect has a strong political dimension since it 
“depends upon and is encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions” 
(Rawls 2005a, 319). 
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One way of protecting citizens’ self-respect would be for the state to grant some form of 
symbolic recognition to all languages (or to as many as it reasonably can) in order to 
guarantee equality of self-respect for all their speakers. This position is defended, for 
example, by Philippe Van Parijs (2011),3 for whom granting symbolic recognition to a 
multitude of languages is a way to achieve “parity of esteem” between them and guarantee 
the equal self-respect of their speakers.4 Indeed, when a dominant language in a multilingual 
polity is systematically preferred to other languages in all contexts, it is akin “to situations in 
which it is always the members of the same caste or gender that need to bow when meeting 
members of the other, or to get off the pavement where it is too narrow for two people to 
walk past each other” (Van Parijs 2011, 119). As a result, Van Parijs argues that state 
institutions and measures “can help by expressing, recognizing, asserting the parity of esteem 
between (some of) the languages with which members of the society concerned identify” 
(Van Parijs 2011, 120). This kind of symbolic recognition conveys the following message: 
“No, it is not true that your language is inferior, less worthy, less noble. Just see how it is 
given the same space or time as the other(s), or possibly one that is different but then for 
reasons publicly given that could not be interpreted as demeaning” (Van Parijs 2011, 121). 
  
The European Union (EU) provides perhaps the clearest example of how parity of esteem 
among different languages can be institutionalized. The EU recognizes twenty-four official 
working languages, and citizens of member states have the right to communicate with its 
institutions in any of the officially recognized languages. Also, most EU legislation is 
translated into all official languages. While the internal business of the European 
Commission is mostly conducted in English, French and German, the European Parliament is 
a fully multilingual institution and all MEPs have the right to use their mother tongue (or any 
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language of their choice) during parliamentary debates (Van Parijs 2011, 117-32; see also 
Bonotti 2013). 
 
What are, then, the implications of the idea of self-respect for language policy under political 
liberalism?  Certainly, for Rawls, the state ought to provide citizens with the “social bases of 
self-respect,” which include “equal basic rights and liberties, the fair value of the political 
liberties and fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 2005a, 82). These are the “public features of 
basic social institutions” (Rawls 2005a, 319), which should be guaranteed for speakers of all 
languages. I have discussed equal basic rights and liberties in the previous section and I will 
focus on fair equality of opportunity in the next section. In addition, as Catriona McKinnon 
has pointed out, “mutual respect [in political life] is evinced in inclusive public justificatory 
debate about matters of justice, couched in the language of public reason” (McKinnon 2012, 
18). This, she claims, contributes to self-respect, which “depends on a person’s conception of 
herself as worthy of being given justifying reasons by any other person capable of having 
expectations of her that she act in a certain way” (McKinnon 2012, 18). 
 
Does this idea of self-respect, however, also require the state and its institutions to grant all 
languages as much symbolic recognition as they reasonably can? One may initially give a 
positive answer to this question, and claim that to provide self-respect for all citizens under 
political liberalism involves guaranteeing their ability “to identify with their political 
institutions” (Laborde 2013, 86). However, we should not overestimate the implications of 
this conclusion for language policy in diverse societies, and assume that self-respect also 
demands that citizens be able to enjoy a symbolic identification with their political 
institutions.5 In fact, as Daniel Brudney points out, arguing that “alienation from the political 
community is in fact a bad thing, bad enough so that it would be irrational to risk any citizen 
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being alienated” (Brudney 2005, 823) would require appealing to a comprehensive doctrine, 
i.e. “the strong-connection-to-the-polity thesis” (Brudney 2005, 823), about which people 
may reasonably disagree. This would therefore contravene (rather than fulfil) the ideal of 
public reason and state neutrality that, we have seen, is essential to guaranteeing all citizens’ 
self-respect under political liberalism.  
 
In this connection it is interesting to note that Sweden, a EU member state, has proposed to 
replace the existing EU translation and interpreting system with one in which those services 
are not automatically made available to all member states but only to those that voluntarily 
demand them and, crucially, are willing to pay for them (Van Parijs 2011, 242-243 note 22). 
Sweden’s request, which may soon also be endorsed by other EU member states, signals the 
absence of a reasonable agreement among EU citizens and member states regarding the 
importance of symbolic recognition as a way of guaranteeing the self-respect of speakers of 
different languages. It is plausible to assume that the same kind of disagreement also exists 
within individual EU member states (and within any state in general).            
 
An alternative proposed measure aimed at guaranteeing the self-respect of speakers of 
different languages is the implementation of a regime of linguistic territoriality (Van Parijs 
2011; Kymlicka 1989, 1995, 2001) based on the idea that “languages should be territorially 
accommodated, such that on each particular territorial unit only one language group is present 
or officially recognized” (De Schutter 2008, 105). However, as De Schutter (2008) points 
out, in such a case it would again be wrong to assume the presence of a reasonable agreement 
regarding the demands of self-respect, among speakers of different languages and, crucially, 
of the same language. More specifically, “people may not have a shared understanding 
of…[their]…language identity interest: different people within the same polity and territory 
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may have different language identity interests” (De Schutter 2008, 112). This also applies to 
speakers of the same language.6 In line with De Schutter, I therefore conclude that in 
societies characterized by a reasonable pluralism of linguistic identities, the adoption of 
linguistic territoriality, as a coercive way of realizing the value of self-respect, is disrespectful 
towards those citizens who do not assign any significant identity value to the protected 
language, even if the latter is their own language.7 
  
The foregoing analysis undermines the view that Rawls’s conception of self-respect requires 
that the state design its institutions so as to grant all languages some form of symbolic 
recognition, or to implement a regime of linguistic territoriality. Like the protection of 
individual rights and liberties, therefore, the safeguard of citizens’ self-respect fails to directly 
justify the need for multilingualism policies under political liberalism. Yet, as I noted earlier, 
for Rawls the ‘social bases of self-respect” (Rawls 2005a, 82) include basic rights and 
liberties, on the one hand, and fair equality of opportunity, on the other hand. Having 
discussed basic rights and liberties in the previous section, in the next and final section I will 
focus on the principle of fair equality of opportunity. More specifically, I will show that this 
principle (and therefore, indirectly, the idea of self-respect) does sometimes demand the 
adoption of multilingualism policies.   
 
Linguistic Diversity and Fair Equality of Opportunity           
So far I have argued that from the perspective of Rawls’s political liberalism it is permissible, 
but not required, for the state to adopt official multilingualism, if what is at stake is the need 
to guarantee basic rights and liberties and equality of self-respect. There is, however, a third 
sense in which political liberalism should guarantee the equal treatment of individuals who 
speak different languages or express a range of linguistic identities. This concerns Rawls’s 
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view, stated in the second principle of justice, that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities…are 
to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity” (Rawls 2005a, 6). 
 
In this section, I would like to consider the linguistic implications of fair equality of 
opportunity by focusing on one particular domain: education. I do this for two reasons: 
firstly, education is the main domain that Rawls considers when discussing in Political 
Liberalism (Rawls 2005a, 248) how to realize his principle of fair equality of opportunity; 
and secondly, education is especially important with regard to language matters, since the 
language(s) in which we learn and the language(s) which we learn, clearly affect our future 
opportunities to access social, economic and political positions, regardless of which specific 
language(s) those positions are available in.  
 
According to Rawls, the principle of fair equality of opportunity should not be included 
among the constitutional essentials, due to the inevitably wide disagreement concerning 
whether and how it can best be realized (Rawls 2005a, 229-30). Like the “difference 
principle,” which constitutes the second part of the second principle of justice, it should be 
left open to the democratic contestation of ordinary politics.8 As I have shown elsewhere 
(Bonotti 2012), this can have interesting implications with regard to religion and, more 
specifically, for the issue of state support of religious schools. As regards to language in 
education, should the state promote monolingual education, accompanied perhaps by 
transitional bilingualism, or should it allow instead for bilingual education or even parallel 
school systems?  
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One way of drawing the implications of the principle of fair equality of opportunity for 
language in education is to argue that it only requires a right to publicly funded education but 
not a right to be educated in one’s native language. At most, political liberalism may require 
that for those children whose native language(s) differ(s) from the one(s) in which education 
is conducted, relevant measures – intensive language training, for example – should be made 
available by the state so that they can be quickly integrated into the educational system.9 This 
conclusion would seem consistent with Rawls’s account of education. While education 
should not aim to promote a comprehensive liberal doctrine, it should prepare children “to be 
fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting” (Rawls 2005a, 
199). Educating children in the official public language certainly contributes to preparing 
them for life within society, so that they have an equal opportunity to participate in its social, 
economic and political activities (e.g. Pogge 2003).10 Monolingual education is therefore 
permissible under political liberalism, and it can be justified by appealing to public reasons. 
 
Yet, while permissible, monolingual education is not required by political liberalism. What 
political liberalism demands is that children develop the ability to be self-supporting and to 
participate fully in their polity’s social, economic and political activities, and this only seems 
to require a working knowledge of the language(s) in which those activities are normally 
carried out. As Daniel Weinstock observes, if working knowledge is all that is needed, and if 
it “can be taught simply through language teaching and through broader access to the 
majority’s culture as a whole, there is little reason for the state to prohibit schooling in 
languages other than that of the majority, provided that it includes learning the majority 
language as well” (Weinstock 2003, 268). Furthermore, many empirical studies have shown 
the effectiveness of bilingual education at developing the academic skills of pupils and, 
therefore, enhancing their opportunities and prospects for social mobility (Willig 1985, 1987; 
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Ramírez, Yuen, and Ramey 1991; Thomas and Collier 2002). This literature also highlights 
the flaws of previous works that defended monolingual education (e.g. on the limits of 
English-only education, see, e.g., Danoff et al. [1978]; Baker and de Kanter [1981]).   
 
This implies that bilingual education can provide children with at least the same range of 
future educational and professional opportunities that monolingualism would offer them. 
That means that both options are permissible under political liberalism. Yet bilingual 
education is generally more expensive than monolingual education. If all we are concerned 
with, as political liberals, is to ensure that we prepare children for full participation in society, 
it would be odd to opt for the more expensive option when we could achieve the same goal 
through a cheaper one. As the amount of public money required for bilingual education – 
unlike the amount required for merely symbolic forms of language recognition – is not trivial, 
it is necessary for those who support it to provide a reasonable justification for it, different 
and supplementary to the one that also justifies monolingual education. In other words, it 
needs to be assessed whether and for what reasons fair equality of opportunity can best be 
ensured by enabling children to have access to bilingual education rather than monolingual 
(e.g. English-only) education. 
 
Such reasons, I argue, can be found by considering the high costs of linguistic assimilation. 
As per Kymlicka (1989, 175): 
 
“People are bound, in an important way, to their own cultural community. We can”t 
just transplant people from one culture to another, even if we provide the opportunity to 
learn the other language and culture. Someone’s upbringing isn’t something that can 
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just be erased; it is, and will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural 
membership affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity.”  
 
Hence, while assimilation into the majority cultural and linguistic community (e.g. through 
monolingual English-only programmes) may in theory open up a wide range of economic and 
educational opportunities for members of minorities, it is a distressing process that may leave 
many unable to benefit from those opportunities. Crucially, the costs associated with 
linguistic assimilation are not something political liberalism should or can be indifferent to. 
Indeed, while for Rawls state legislation should be guided by “neutrality of aim” rather than 
“neutrality of effect” (Rawls 2005a, 193-4), political liberalism should also pay attention to 
the uneven impact of state policies on the citizenry, and to the unreasonable burdens that 
specific policies (e.g. monolingual education) may impose upon certain people (Rawls 1999a, 
153-4; Laborde 2013; Quong 2006). 
 
However, we should be careful not to ascribe to people certain cultural commitments and 
linguistic identities, and to assume that all people attribute value to their language as a source 
of identity. These claims are problematic because they do not give sufficient weight to the 
subjective element at stake in the evaluation of opportunities, including those offered by 
linguistic assimilation. Individuals generally make a “judgment” call as to whether the costs 
involved in taking advantage of an opportunity are too high, either through empirical 
observations or by appealing to “what we know in general about human interests and human 
psychology” (Miller 2013, 102). For example, if we observe that “most Sikhs are unwilling to 
attend schools that prohibit turbans, and are prepared to send their sons to poorer schools 
rather than abandon the norm, that is good evidence about the magnitude of the costs” (Miller 
2013, 104).  
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But why not go any further than this? Why not ask people about their cultural commitments 
and beliefs rather than ascribing such commitments to them? Why not ask about how 
burdensome the costs involved in taking advantage of certain opportunities are for them and 
their children? In fact, this is the view that Miller himself defends, by arguing that “only 
democratic debate can yield the kind of information that we need to apply the principle [of 
equality of opportunity] in a multicultural context” (Miller 2013, 112). As Monique Deveaux 
points out, “[w]ithout an accurate representation of how particular customs are practiced and 
affect different individuals, it is difficult to conceive of reforms that will help to protect and 
empower vulnerable individuals” (Deveaux 2006, 93).  
 
This is even more important in the case of linguistic identities, for two reasons. First, we 
should engage in democratic deliberation in order to find out about people’s preferences with 
regard to existing or proposed language policies, and how burdensome they may find them in 
relation to their linguistic identities. Second, we should also employ democratic deliberation 
to find out whether people actually have the linguistic identities that we think they have. As 
noted earlier, speaking one language does not mean automatically valuing it as a source of 
identity rather than as a mere instrument of communication (see De Schutter 2008). 
 
Take Ukraine, for example, where the recent crisis has brought long-standing linguistic 
divides to the fore. As a result of its troubled history and Soviet legacy, Ukraine displays 
“vast discrepancy between ethnic and language identities on one hand and between language 
identity and practice on the other” (Kulyk 2013, 282). More specifically, as a result of the 
USSR’s promotion of Russian as the lingua franca across its component republics, “most 
people switching to Russian in their language practice adhered to their Ukrainian ethnic 
16 
 
identity which the regime did not pressure them to renounce, and many also retained the 
notion of Ukrainian as native language which thus meant an attachment rather than practice 
(for descendants of those who had switched to Russian, it was often the language they never 
learned or used but nevertheless identified with)” (Kulyk 2013, 282). Given that languages 
can have both communicative and identity dimensions, we should assume that the type of 
discrepancy that exists in Ukraine can also be found, to differing degrees, in other and 
perhaps even most societies. This makes it even more pressing, for political theorists 
interested in language policy, to move beyond mere assumptions and judgments about 
people’s linguistic identities, and rely instead on the more solid knowledge and understanding 
of such identities that can result from engagement in democratic deliberation (as well as from 
greater attention to empirical research). 
 
Political liberalism cannot be immune from this challenge. Political liberals, that is, should 
not make any assumptions as to whether members of linguistic minorities – autochthonous or 
allochthonus – wish to preserve their linguistic identity or be assimilated into the mainstream 
language and culture. Linguistic identities, the importance that people attach to them, and the 
costs associated with renouncing them in order to take advantage of available opportunities, 
should emerge from democratic deliberation rather than being taken for granted. This is 
consistent with Rawls’s view, mentioned earlier, that the issue of whether and when the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity is realized should be object of democratic 
deliberation and contestation. It will be up to individuals and groups to mobilize in favour of 
different policy proposals (see Laitin and Reich 2003), with none having the right to establish 
a specific language policy regime through constitutional or legal means. 
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The view that Rawls’s political liberalism encourages deliberation is, of course, not new. 
Rawls’s view of public reason, we have already seen, requires citizens to justify their position 
with regard to fundamental matters of justice on the basis of reasons all other citizens could 
reasonably accept as free and equal. It should not be assumed, however, that such reasons are 
already predetermined and therefore render public deliberation redundant. On the contrary, as 
Anthony Simon Laden points out, in order to assess whether a reason is acceptable by our 
fellow citizens “we will actually have to go and see whether it can be by offering it to our 
fellow citizens and seeing what sort of responses it brings” (Laden 2001, 197; see also 
Bonotti 2015). This means that political liberalism provides the foundations for what Laden 
calls “deliberative liberalism” (Laden 2001, 5).11  
 
Furthermore, Rawls points out that “[s]ocial changes over generations also give rise to new 
groups with different political problems. Views raising new questions related to ethnicity, 
gender, and race are obvious examples, and the political conceptions that result from these 
views will debate the current conception. The content of public reason is not fixed, any more 
than it is defined by any one reasonable political conception” (Rawls 2005a, li). Rawls is 
therefore not insensitive to the need for a dynamic and constantly changing kind of public 
reasoning, which allows political values to be redefined and revised on the basis of changing 
social, cultural and historical circumstances.  
 
Rawls’s political liberalism, therefore, allows scope for the kind of democratic deliberation 
that is necessary in order to decide how the principle of fair equality of opportunity (for 
Rawls, a fundamental principle of justice) is best realized in the realm of language policy, 
including education policy. It is through the democratic deliberation involved in the process 
of public reasoning that individuals can offer their reasons in support of monolingual or 
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bilingual policies to their fellow citizens, revealing their linguistic identities and the 
opportunity-related costs that different policies may entail for them. As Sarah Song points 
out, this process is crucial since “[w]hat counts as sufficiently burdensome such that the 
groups should be accommodated in some way cannot be determined in advance of 
deliberative enquiry” (Song 2007, 75). This exchange of “mutually acceptable reasons” 
(Song 2007, 71, original emphasis), which closely mirrors Rawls’s conception of public 
reasoning, is necessary since “[w]hile the state or employer (or other institution involved in 
the conflict) bears the burden of justifying the burden imposed on the group, the minority 
group bears the burden of explaining how a particular law or policy imposes a burden on 
them” (Song 2007, 75).    
 
Most importantly, according to Rawls’s “wide” (Rawls 2005b, 462) view of public reason, 
when citizens engage in this process of deliberation they can also appeal to their 
comprehensive doctrines as long as “in due course proper political reasons – and not reasons 
given solely by comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support 
whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (Rawls 2005b, 462). 
This also implies that a Rawlsian-inspired democratic deliberation avoids the risk, 
highlighted by Monique Deveaux, that “[a]n idealized model of deliberation that [...] rules 
out certain kinds of reasons in advance in the hope that these will not impact deliberation, 
may succeed only in reinforcing the advantages enjoyed by powerful participants in 
deliberation” (Deveaux 2006, 105-106).   
     
A conception of democratic deliberation grounded in the ideal of public reason also helps to 
prevent the potential majoritarian implications of democratic contestation. If deliberation 
reveals the importance that members of certain linguistic minorities attribute to their 
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linguistic identity, and to the costs resulting from the imposition upon them of monolingual 
policies, it is unreasonable for democratic majorities not to legislate accordingly. As we have 
already seen, the uneven impact of linguistic assimilation on the citizenry is not something 
political liberalism should or can be indifferent to (Rawls 1999a, 153-4; Laborde 2013; 
Quong 2006). Ignoring that impact would be unreasonable - especially when it has been 
highlighted during public deliberation by members of linguistic minorities as one of the 
reasons in support of (or against) certain language policies concerning fair equality of 
opportunity. Interestingly, Deveaux invokes the need for “a stronger requirement of 
consensus so that majority views do not automatically hold sway in decision-making or come 
to dominate dissenting views” (Deveaux 2000, 169, original emphasis). She then highlights 
that this consensus involves “fair procedures for political deliberation and decision-making” 
(ibid.) but not the kinds of “conversational constraints” (Deveaux 2000, 170) imposed by the 
ideal of public reason. However, we have already seen that that ideal does not prevent 
citizens from invoking their comprehensive doctrines during the process of public 
deliberation, as that process is necessary in order to establish which reasons will count as 
“public.” 
 
Conclusion 
The implications of political liberalism for linguistic diversity and language policy have been 
neglected in the vast body of Rawlsian scholarship. In this paper, I have especially examined 
what kind of equality the state should guarantee speakers of different languages under 
political liberalism. Both monolingualism and multilingualism policies, I have argued, are 
permissible under political liberalism with regard to the protection of citizens’ basic rights 
and liberties and of their self-respect. I have then discussed the implications of Rawls’s idea 
of fair equality of opportunity for language policy and argued that even though official 
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monolingualism is in principle permissible under political liberalism, it would be 
unreasonable to implement when the burden it imposes upon certain individuals and groups 
are excessive. In these instances various forms of official multilingualism (including bilingual 
education) may therefore be warranted. This implies that once deliberation has helped us to 
ascertain people’s linguistic identities, the costs they associate with the enjoyment of 
available opportunities, and their resulting demands with regard to language policy, justice 
requires that such demands are fulfilled (within practical limits and “where numbers 
warrant”) in order to guarantee fair equality of opportunity for speakers of all languages, and 
regardless of what democratic majorities may think. 
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1
 For a notable exception, see De Shutter (2008). 
2
 While Rawls’s assumption is obviously wrong, as most if not all western societies are de facto and 
increasingly de jure multilingual, it does not preclude the possibility that all citizens could share a common 
language, if not as a common mother tongue at least as a common lingua franca which they could learn and in 
which they could deliberate. In this sense, Rawls’s assumption differs from the much stronger one made by Will 
Kymlicka, for whom “democratic politics is politics in the vernacular” (Kymlicka 2001, 213), i.e. in one’s 
mother tongue, and democratic political debate is possible “across...religious/ideological/racial cleavages” 
(Kymlicka 2001, 212) but not across linguistic borders. As it has been shown elsewhere (Archibugi 2005; 
Bonotti 2013; Van Parijs 2011, 30), Kymlicka’s assumption is flawed because people clearly can deliberate (and 
do so effectively) in a language which is not their mother tongue. 
3
 For the idea that self-respect demands the public recognition of cultural identities, see also James Tully (1995) 
and Iris Marion Young (1990). 
4
 I overlook here the difference between “self-respect” and “self-esteem” which, unlike in Van Parijs’s analysis, 
are normally treated as two different concepts in contemporary political theory. For my present analysis, it 
suffices to point out that Van Parijs himself acknowledges Rawls’s idea of self-respect as a clear point of 
reference for his analysis (Van Parijs 2011, 238 note 1).  
5
 I am assuming that symbolic state recognition of languages is truly “symbolic.” This may not always be the 
case. Laborde, for example, argues that state recognition of religious symbols involves “too trivial amounts of 
taxation to raise significant issues about the fairness of public fund allocation” (Laborde 2013, 81). Yet costs 
seem to be important in relation to the symbolic recognition of languages. For example, while “only” 1% of the 
EU’s budget is earmarked for language services (Gravier and Lundquist 2011, 81), this amount corresponds to 
approximately half of Burundi’s GDP (Van Parijs 2011, 242 note 21). Whether and when the costs of symbolic 
language recognition are “trivial” may thus be a matter of dispute.    
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6
 See, for example, the case of Ukraine that I discuss later in the paper. 
7
 According to De Schutter, linguistic territoriality contravenes the view that “a shared understanding on one 
comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power and should therefore not be 
considered as an ideal” (2008, p. 112). 
8
 In this paper, I set aside a discussion of the “difference principle” in relation to language and linguistic justice. 
9
 This would still be compatible with guaranteeing the right of minority language speakers to set up private 
bilingual schools in their own language at their cost, as long as such schools respect the basic rights and liberties 
of individual children, certain minimum curriculum standards, and guarantee an adequate learning of the 
majority language – so that children’s fair equality of opportunity to succeed in the broader society is not 
undermined. 
10
 It may be the case, of course, that fair equality of opportunity is not sufficient to prevent further injustices. 
According to Van Parijs (2011), for example, native proficiency in the dominant language in a multilingual 
polity can be considered as a natural talent and therefore may not be covered by the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. Native speakers, that is, are more likely than non-native speakers to succeed in the social and 
economic spheres. However, if non-native speakers end up worse off as a result, then the Rawlsian “difference 
principle” justifies redistributing resources from the wealthier native speakers to the poorer non-native speakers, 
even though no specific reference to language is required to justify this (Van Parijs 2011, pp. 98-99). I do not 
have the space to address these issues here. 
11
 The deliberative democratic implications of Rawls’s political liberalism have also been famously developed 
by Joshua Cohen (1989), and by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996). They have also been 
acknowledged by Rawls himself (Rawls 2005b, p. 448).   
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